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Director, Office of External Affairs

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# U.S. Plans New Way to Check Soviet Missile Tests

By RICHARD BURT  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 23 — The Carter Administration, concerned that Turkey might not allow U-2 reconnaissance planes over its territory, is preparing an alternative plan for verifying the new strategic arms treaty with Moscow, officials here said today.

The plan, they said, calls for several improvements to existing methods for monitoring Soviet missile tests, including the upgrading of an electronic listening post in Norway and the use of a satellite that is now programmed to collect other information.

Although the officials acknowledged that the use of specially designed U-2R planes flying over Turkey offered the best substitute for listening stations lost in Iran early this year, they asserted that the alternative improvements to other intelligence systems would enable the Administration to insure that Moscow did not exceed restrictions on missile modernization contained in the arms treaty.

## A New Satellite by 1983

They said that as early as 1983, the United States would possess a new satellite that could monitor almost all the missile test data formerly obtained by the monitoring sites in Iran.

State Department officials pointed to a statement yesterday by the Turkish Foreign Ministry indicating that the U-2 might still be permitted to fly over the country. Although a ranking Turkish Army officer said earlier this week that the flights could not be permitted "under

present circumstances," a Foreign Ministry spokesman said the Government had not reached a final decision.

Despite this, critics of the arms accord on Capitol Hill maintained that, with or without the surveillance flights, the United States could not verify restrictions against increases in size and payload of existing missiles.

## Big Soviet Explosion Detected

The verification controversy heated up this week with reports that the Soviet Union conducted an underground nuclear test last Saturday that might have exceeded limits laid down in an accord Moscow signed in 1974 with Washington.

The accord put a ceiling of 150 kilotons on the size of such nuclear explosions. Some American experts believe that the latest Soviet test might have been twice that size. One kiloton is equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT.

Although it is unclear whether the Soviet test exceeded the 150 kiloton limit, officials said the Administration has asked Moscow to explain the possible infraction.

Meanwhile, officials said that plans were under way at the Central Intelligence Agency and in the Pentagon to collect missile test data previously obtained by the stations in Iran by using a satellite, code-named Chalet, and a large radio intercept antenna in Norway.

## Signals Can Be Intercepted

They said both the satellite and the ground station in Norway could be adjusted to pick up some of the radio signals broadcast by Soviet missiles

during flight tests. The telemetry signals provide data on missile performance characteristics and are thus considered vital to verifying the treaty provisions concerning modernization of weapons.

Earlier, officials said, the possibility of building a monitoring station in Pakistan similar to those lost in Iran, had been considered by the Administration. The proposal was turned down after informal contacts with Pakistani authorities indicated that it would not be accepted.

A proposal for using high-altitude rockets launched from ships in the Indian Ocean to monitor missile test signals was also dismissed as technically unfeasible, they said.

## Critics See Holes in Detection

Congressional critics of the proposal to rely on the Norwegian station and satellites for verification contended that these systems would only be able to pick up a small fraction of the missile telemetry obtained previously at the Iranian sites. They said that a major fraction of the Iran stations had been to collect missile data transmitted during the first 60 seconds of a test launch and that this data could not be collected from Norway or from existing systems in space.

Pentagon officials said that for Moscow to build a new missile undetected, it would have to shield 20 or so test launches from American surveillance systems for more than a year. They contended that modest improvements to existing reconnaissance capabilities ruled out the possibility of a large-scale covert program of this sort.

NEW YORK TIMES

29 June 1979

27 SEPTEMBER 1982

1982

# Old leak may sink Burt nomination

## JOHN LOFTON'S JOURNAL

ILLEGIB

A white-hot, knock-down-drag-out, behind-the-scenes battle is rapidly coming to a head over the nomination of former New York Times correspondent Richard Burt to be assistant secretary of state for European affairs. The issue: should an ex-reporter who wrote a story containing classified information damaging to the national security be named to such a high government post?

The critics of Burt include:

- Intelligence Committee Chairman Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., who on July 21 wrote a top secret code word letter to Secretary of State George Shultz asking that Burt's nomination be withdrawn. Inexplicably, Goldwater's request was neither acknowledged nor answered. And Burt's nomination was sent forward to the Foreign Relations Committee.

- Sens. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., Don Nickles, R-Okla., John East, R-N.C., Orrin Hatch R-Utah, and James McClure R-Idaho, all of whom wrote a letter about Burt on September 15 to Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Sen. Charles Percy R-Ill. In this letter the senators call Percy's attention to two things: (1) "the most serious questions" raised by a three-year old Burt article in the Times and (2) "a record of indiscretions committed by Mr. Burt," a record supposedly compiled by the State Department's Security Bureau. Burt denies any such indiscretions.

- And finally, although its recommendation was ignored by Secretary Shultz, the White House Presidential Personnel Office also opposed Burt's nomination.

Among Burt's defenders are: U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the U.N. Ken Adelman; former Kissinger protege Helmut Sonnenfeldt; and Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Mark Palmer. In recent weeks, all three have phoned various Senate staffers to lobby for Burt's nomination.

In separate interviews, here's what I've been told. Adelman says the case against Burt rests on "lousy grounds." Sonnenfeldt thinks Burt is getting a "bum rap." And Palmer believes the issues being raised against Burt are "outrageous." Burt refuses to talk on-the-record about his situation.

So, what is the beef about Burt? Well, the central controversy revolves around an article he wrote for the Times on June 29, 1979. In this piece, quoting only "officials," Burt reported in detail how the Carter administration — concerned that Turkey might not allow U-2 reconnaissance planes over its territory — was preparing an alternative plan for verifying the new strategic arms treaty with Moscow. This plan, it was said, called for several improvements to existing methods for monitoring Soviet missile tests, including the upgrading of an electronic listening post in Norway and the use of a satellite that was programmed to collect other information.

Now, there's no doubt that the information in Burt's story was classified. When asked this question directly in his confirmation hearing on Sept. 15 before the Foreign Relations Committee, Burt replied:

"Well, I will be quite honest. I assumed that it probably was (classified material)... I presumed it was sensitive information." In fact, Burt said that following the publication of his article he was made aware "by people" that his story had created "concern" within the intelligence community. Noting that he was "somewhat alarmed" by this, Burt says he "immediately sought appointments with (at the time CIA Director) Stansfield Turner about this problem."

"A source I consider reliable, says that Burt's story compromised one of this country's "most secret and fragile" intelligence gathering systems. It did this in three ways, according to another equally reliable source: (1) It named the satellite; (2) It named its original mission; and (3) It revealed that this satellite could be reprogrammed.

Tomorrow the Senate Intelligence Committee will turn over to the Foreign Relations Committee a damage assessment report which will evaluate the damage done by Burt's three-year-old article. My sources say that while this report will be understated, it will be "devastating" to the contention by Burt and his backers that his Times story did no real harm to U.S. national security. Even Ken Adelman, one of Burt's defenders, tells me he has "no doubt" that the information Burt published "damaged the national interest."

What's astounding about this whole affair is the nonchalance on the part of Burt's backers regarding the very serious issue of his having disclosed classified information. Adelman argues that Burt was just "doing his job" and "that's what happens in Washington — people are given information and publish it." Sonnenfeldt says he doesn't see how a defense or national security reporter "who is given stuff" can avoid publishing it. He observes:

"It would be a shame if Rick was singled out. If journalists once get pilloried for having used stuff given to them by people with access to classified or sensitive information, it's going to go a long way — maybe even to some of the people attacking this particular journalist."

Mark Palmer, who says he doesn't want to go into who he has called in Burt's behalf, says only that the charges against Burt are "outrageous." Both Adelman and Sonnenfeldt readily admitted that they had not investigated thoroughly just how damaging Burt's article in the Times was.

At Burt's confirmation hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee, Sen. Joe Biden, D-Del., — who is also a member of the Intelligence Committee — treated the whole subject as a joke. He got a laugh when he said that he had heard it rumored "that on occasion senators have leaked sensitive information for political purposes."

Ha-ha.

Just exactly how the flap over Richard Burt's nomination will turn out remains to be seen. But, the relevant question has been raised by Sen. Claiborne Pell, D-R.I., Who asks: is Burt's article in the Times material to the consideration of his appointment? The answer must be: it most certainly is and Burt's critics are absolutely correct in raising this issue.

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WASHINGTON POST  
22 SEPTEMBER 1982

# Hill Panel to Disclose Criticism of Intelligence on Central America

By David Hoffman  
and George Lardner Jr.  
Washington Post Staff Writers

The House intelligence committee voted at a closed-door session yesterday to brush aside objections from the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies and make public a staff report critical of those agencies' performance in Central America in recent years.

The report, scheduled for release today, was heavily edited to tone down several criticisms and satisfy complaints of intelligence agency backers on the committee. For example, the phrase "rightist violence" was changed to "terrorist violence" several times in reference to the weakness of reporting on rightist violence from El Salvador.

A draft copy, reflecting the editing, was obtained by The Washington Post.

The study was commissioned months ago by Rep. Charlie Rose (D-N.C.), chairman of the subcommittee on oversight and evaluation. He told a reporter yesterday that the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the CIA had opposed public release.

"They felt it should be a confidential slap on the wrist," Rose said. "I felt strongly otherwise. It's important that the public know our committee is not afraid to go public with criticism even though that criticism may not be pleasant for the intelligence community."

The 47-page draft covers intelligence reports and assessments during the Carter and Reagan administrations and raises repeated questions about instances in which administration policies may have had skewed intelligence gathering.

"The basic concern is that tendentious rhetoric, including occasional oversimplification and misstatement, can drive out some of the needed collection and analysis," the study concludes. The study repeatedly emphasizes what the committee staff described as the high quality of most intelligence reporting from Central America. But the staff said that it wanted to "sound an early note of concern about the larger costs that might be incurred by the particular kinds of weaknesses" found. Shortcomings included:

- A major intelligence briefing for the committee last March 4 on outside communist support for the Salvadoran insurgency was "flawed by several instances of overstatement and overinterpretation."

At one point, the committee was told that "lots of ships have been traced" from the Soviet Union to unloading points in Nicaragua, but a later, written response conceded that "only a small number had actually been tracked all along the route."

- A slide at the same briefing on "guerrilla financing" indicated that Salvadoran guerrillas were receiving about \$17 million a year in addition to weapons, but the calculation was an extrapolation "based on a single piece of evidence indicating the monthly budget for the commander of one faction on one front."

On closer questioning, the committee was told that the \$17 million figure was "not an estimate" but intended "only to indicate that 'relatively large sums of currency' were going to the guerrillas."

- Assurances by a CIA official last

February that Salvadoran authorities had made much progress in reducing acts of violence by their forces turned out, on further committee inquiry, to have been based solely on statements from the Salvadoran Defense Ministry about disciplinary actions for infractions such as drunkenness and thievery.

A four-page section of the draft report said the intelligence community had denounced a Washington Post report Feb. 14 about a bloody Salvadoran military sweep operation as "propaganda" by a writer traveling with a guerrilla fighting unit. No intelligence data was found to contradict the writer's statement that he had been with noncombatants.

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PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER  
30 SEPTEMBER 1982

# Ex-U.S. official describes meetings between Wilson, active CIA officer

By Michael J. Sniffen  
Associated Press

WASHINGTON — A former federal official told a judge yesterday that a CIA officer met with former agent Edwin P. Wilson to discuss obtaining a Soviet anti-aircraft missile and a jet fighter from Libya.

The disclosure by the former official, Paul Cyr, represents the first assertion in court that a CIA officer on active duty had dealt with Wilson in the late 1970s — after Wilson had left the agency and had begun working with the radical Arab government of Libya.

Wilson faces trial here on charges of supplying explosives for a Libyan terrorist-training school and conspiring to assassinate a Libyan dissident. His attorneys have said his defense would be that he was working for the CIA.

Cyr's disclosure about the meetings between Wilson and the CIA official came as Cyr was sentenced yesterday on unrelated charges.

The CIA has repeatedly denied any official involvement with Wilson during the time he was dealing with Libya. However, Justice Department sources have said that CIA officials active at the time might become targets of prosecution as a result of the Wilson case.

Cyr said he believed that Wilson had been working for the CIA be-

cause he had been present at meetings between Wilson and Theodore Shackley, then associate deputy CIA director for clandestine operations.

But Assistant U.S. Attorney Carol Bruce told the judge that the government believed Wilson had just been offering assistance in an effort to kill a federal investigation of him.

Cyr's attorney, Daniel Grove, said there was no indication that Wilson had ever obtained the Soviet equipment.

Cyr disclosed the meetings to U.S. District Judge John H. Pratt before being sentenced on two counts of accepting a gratuity from Wilson while working for the Federal Energy Administration. Cyr had pleaded guilty to the two counts in a plea bargain with the government.

Cyr said he was describing the Wilson-Shackley meetings to put on record another effort on his behalf to aid the U.S. government.

Cyr said he first met Wilson in 1969 while working for the U.S. Army Materiel Command. They became such good friends, Cyr said, that Wilson provided a home for Cyr's youngest son for several years during a Cyr family crisis.

Cyr said that in the late 1970s, when Wilson was traveling back and forth between Washington and Libya, "I met with him and one thing that was strongly suggested was that Wilson use his position to obtain

from the Libyan government Russian materiel that the United States was trying to get. Wilson agreed to this. We did meet, and I was present, with Ted Shackley."

Shackley, who has since left the agency, could not be reached yesterday for comment. CIA spokesman Dale Peterson said yesterday that "an exhaustive search of our files has not uncovered any evidence that the CIA asked Wilson to obtain Soviet equipment from Libya."

Cyr said there had been discussions of obtaining a Soviet SA-8 anti-aircraft missile about 1977 or 1978 and of obtaining a MiG-26 jet fighter.

Cyr told the judge: "I thought Wilson was in the CIA. I sat in on meetings with Wilson and Ted Shackley, and Wilson was telling him what the Russians were doing there."

Cyr was charged with accepting money from Wilson for introducing a computer company, which was seeking federal contracts, to federal energy procurement officials. The exact amount he received is undetermined, but the government estimates it was between \$3,000 and \$6,000.

Cyr could have received four years in prison and a \$20,000 fine, but Pratt sentenced him to three years' probation, a \$5,000 fine and community service as a counselor with a northern Virginia alcoholism group.

## Appeals Court Backs CIA on Campus Secrecy

United Press International

The CIA may keep secret not only the names of American colleges where it has intelligence sources, but also those where it doesn't, a federal appeals court ruled yesterday.

The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals here, upholding a lower court, rejected a student's request under the Freedom of Information Act for the CIA either to confirm or deny that it had covert contacts on any campus of the University of California.

"To admit that the CIA had such contacts at this university would allow foreign intelligence agencies to try to zero in and identify specifically what where the nature of those relationships or with whom," the court said.

But it also would be dangerous to order the CIA to deny whether it had a contact at a certain university, the court said. It noted the agency has received more than 125 requests for information on covert contacts at about 100 schools.

"If the agency were required to indicate those schools with which it had had no covert contact, the work of foreign intelligence bodies would obviously be much easier," the court said.

"They could and would concentrate their efforts on the remaining American colleges and universities, and their sphere of activity could be appreciably narrowed," the panel said.

The CIA has acknowledged it uses American academics and students at American schools as intelligence sources.

Some, who have traveled abroad or are experts in a particular field of study, are sought out for confidential information, advice or help in recruiting foreign intelligence sources, court papers said. The agency also has contacts for scientific and social research.

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THE WASHINGTON TIMES  
24 SEPTEMBER 1982

# Hill panel probes allegations of Soviet tie in pope shooting

By John McKeelway  
WASHINGTON TIMES STAFF

A Hill panel began collecting testimony yesterday linking the Soviet Union to the 1981 attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II.

The Helsinki Commission, made up of 12 members of Congress and formed after the Helsinki Accords of 1975, monitors violations of the agreement.

Author Claire Sterling, an expert in terrorist activities, continued to suggest that the Soviet Union, through the KGB and the secret service of Bulgaria, were the "hidden forces" behind the gunman, Mehmet Ali Agca.

Sterling recently wrote a Reader's Digest article tracing the path of Agca from his birthplace in Turkey to St. Peter's Square in Rome.

"In Italy, as nearly everywhere else in the West, governing leaders could hardly welcome hard evidence of Soviet Russia's complicity in a terrorist hit deliberately designed to outrage and shock the world, she told the commission. "The impact on international relations might be

shattering. The temptation to look the other way might prove irresistible again, as it has so frequently before."

Sterling, under questioning by Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, R-N.Y., said she has not been questioned by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) despite months of gathering information on the gunman.

"I find it shocking that you have not been approached by the intelligence community," D'Amato said.

D'Amato, meanwhile, revealed that he may have been the source for an NBC report earlier this week that the pope threatened to resign and return to Poland if Russia moved to crush the Solidarity movement. The threat was contained in a private letter the pope sent to Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev, an NBC spokesman said.

D'Amato remarked during the hearing that he knew the "monsignor" who carried the message. Later, outside the hearing room, he said he could not name the monsignor at this time.

The theory that Russia wanted to remove the pope because of his close

ties to Poland and the growing strength of Solidarity has been suggested by both Sterling and NBC. The Vatican, meanwhile, remains silent on whether or not the letter was sent by the pope. Polish authorities eventually clamped down on the Polish labor movement while the pope slowly recovered from his wounds.

D'Amato told the hearing, "I am convinced that the Soviet KGB had full knowledge of, and, at least tacitly, supported the plot to kill the pope." He said the pope's actions toward human rights movements in Poland "clearly annoyed officials in the Kremlin."

In a report to members of the commission, the staff said new evidence supports the claim that the assassin "did not act alone."

It said: "He is not a Muslim fanatic, or religious at all; he is not an active rightist or nationalist in Turkish terms; he is not stupid, ignorant, mentally unbalanced or a psychopath. Agca is an international terrorist, trained to kill, managed and financially supported by some 'organized' element."